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Adjmi v. State, 154 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1963)
Petitioners were charged in a single count with a single act of grand
larceny. The state presented proof of fourteen acts of grand larceny
by false pretenses that occurred at different times and places, but
which were pursuant to a single intent to defraud. Petitioners moved
that the state elect one act to rely upon for conviction. This motion
was denied, and the petitioners were convicted upon a general verdict
of "Guilty, grand larceny." On appeal, the Third District Court of
Appeal1 affirmed the conviction, holding that the separate acts of taking were motivated by a single intent or impulse constituting a single
continuous offense, so that the state could not be required to proceed
based on a single act of taking. The supreme court, on petition for certiorari based on the conflict of this decision with prior supreme court
decisions, 2 HELD, the state is required to elect the one act of taking it
intends to rely on for conviction, because a single impulse or intent
does not join a series of acts of larceny by false pretenses occurring at
different times and places into a single offense. Judgment quashed
with direction, Thomas, Thornal, and O'Connell, JJ. dissenting.
The majority view in this country is that several physical acts of
larceny that are separated in time or space may be held to constitute a
single offense if they are united by a single intent or impulse to steal
from an individual. The California 4 and New York5 courts have applied the single impulse doctrine to the crime of obtaining property by
false pretenses as well as to common law larceny. There is a minority
view, on the other hand, which requires a continuous, uninterrupted
physical act as an essential element of common law larceny.0 This
view will not allow a single impulse to combine separate acts of taking
1. Adjmi v. State, 139 So. 2d 179 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1962).
2. Hearn v. State, 55 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1951); Campbell v. State, 155 Fla.
859, 21 So. 2d 127 (1944); Connor v. State, 29 Fla. 455, 10 So. 891 (1892).
3. E.g., People v. Howes, 99 Cal. App. 2d 808, 222 P.2d 969 (1st D.C.A.
Cal. 1950); Horsey v. State, 225 Md. 80, 169 A.2d 457 (1961); State v. Stegall,
860 Mo. 31, 226 S.W.2d 720 (1950); People v. Cox, 286 N.Y. 187, 86 N.E.2d 84

(1941).
4. People v. Bailey, 44 Cal. 2d 514, 360 P.2d 39 (1961).
5. People v. Licausi, 200 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Suffolk County Ct. 1960). But see
People v. Rossi, 169 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Nassau County Ct. 1958).
6. Reynolds v. State, 101 Ga. App. 715, 115 S.E.2d 214 (1960); Barnes v.
State, 230 Miss. 299, 92 So. 2d 868 (1957).
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into a single offense.
The single impulse theory is an innovation that can be explained
but not justified. Its adoption and continued use can be attributed
to both expediency and an apparently faulty interpretation of the
common law crime of larceny. The leading case in support of the theory is People v. Cox. 7 In this case the defendant, who had committed
several separate acts of petit larceny over a two-year period, was convicted of a single charge of grand larceny. The court affirmed the conviction, thereby allowing the state to circumvent the statutory distinction between grand and petit larceny. The decision was based, in
part, on the assumption that the common law allowed several acts of
taldng to be treated as a single offense if they were united by a single
impulse.
The English cases that were relied on by the court in the Cox case
to support this view do not in fact sustain it.8 In each of the English
cases the courts required a "continuous transaction." While this phrase
could be interpreted as contemplating either continuous physical activity or continuous intent, all of these decisions involved the former.
In Regina v. Bleasdale,9 involving the taking of coal from one mine
over a period of several years, the court required that the mining operations be continuous without clearly specifying whether physical or
mental continuity was required. The later case of Regina v. Shepherd-0 concerned the violation of a statute prohibiting the larceny of
trees. There, the conviction was sustained because it was shown that
two trees of a value sufficient to bring the case within the statute, were
so close together that they might reasonably be presumed to have been
cut down at one continuous time. In Regina v. Firth," a common law
larceny situation involving the taking of gas from a main through a
secret pipe, the court sustained the conviction because the act of taking
was continuous. The court said: 12
In the present case it was contended that there was only a taking from time to time when the gas was turned on; but the fact
was that there was a pipe to the main which was always open
and contained gas and there was no period when it was closed.
It is impossible not to say as to that, that is was one continuous
act.
7. 286 N.Y. 137, 86 N.E.2d 84 (1941); Annot. 186 A.L.R. 948 (1942).
8. Regina v. Henwood, 22 L.T.R. (n.s.) 486 (Cr. Gas. 1870); Regina v. Firth,
11 Cox Crim. Cas. 284 (1869); Regina v. Shepherd, 11 Cox Grim. Cas. 119
(1868); Regina v. Bleasdale, 2 Car. & K. 765, 175 Eng. Rep. 321 (N.P. 1848).
9. Regina v. Bleasdale, supra note 8.
10. Regina v. Shepherd, supra note 8.
11. Regina v. Firth, supra note 8.
12. Id. at 240.
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It would be difficult to conclude from these cases that the common law
courts allowed a single impulse to join several acts of taking into a single offense. It seems clear, moreover, that at common law several acts
of petit larceny could not be combined to form a grand larceny.' 3
Florida adheres to common law principles in the absence of statutes
and decisions to the contrary.' 4 Decisions of the Florida Supreme
Court have, in fact, reiterated the common law view. In Campbell v.
State,'8 the court recognized that a continuous physical act was a requisite for the crime of common law larceny. The court reaffirmed this
holding in Hearn v. State' by declaring that the taking of property
from several victims was a single offense because it was taken at the
same time and from the same place by a continuous physical act. In
the Adimi case the court repudiates the attempt to apply the single
impulse theory to the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses.
Although the Second District Court of Appeal has receftly applied the
single impulse theory to the crime of embezzlement,l 7 it is unlikely that
the Florida Supreme Court would affirm this holding in view of its past
refusals to accept this theory.
The paramount reason for the common law rules requiring a continuous act of taking to form a larceny and forbidding the combination
of petit larcenies to form a grand larceny was the desire to mitigate the
severity of the law which declared grand larceny to be a capital offense.' 8 Although it is no longer a capital offense, the consequences of
a conviction of grand larceny, a felony, are still far more serious than
are those of a conviction of petit larceny, a misdemeanor. This is reflected by statutes involving habitual criminality,19 the compounding
of felonies, 20 criminal homicides perpetrated while committing other
crimes, 2 ' and loss of civil rights upon conviction. 22 The single impulse
theory, a novel principle, should not be used to convict as a felon one
considered by the common law courts to be a mere petit thief. This is
especially true in view of the rule that criminal statutes are to be
23
strictly construed against the state.
13. Rex v. Petrie, I Leach CL 294, 168 Eng. Rep. 249 (Cr. Cas. 1784).
14. FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1963).
15. 155 Fla. 859, 20 So. 2d 127 (1944).
16. 55 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1951).
17. Harper v. State, 141 So. 2d 606 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
18. RDziNowIcz, A HISTORY or ENrIsmH CaLmmau LAw, 96-97 (1948).
19. FLA. STAT. §§775.09-.10 (1963).
20. FLA. STAT. §843.14 (1963).
21. FLA. STAT. §§782.04, .10 (1963).
22. FLA. STAT. §97.041(4), (5) (1968) (suffrage); FLA. STAT. §§112.01,

876.25(1) (1963)

(right to hold office); FLA.

STAT.

§§40.01(2), .07 (1963)

(right to serve as a juror).
23. Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920); People v. Lyons, 197
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While this consideration favors the accused, the state is favored by
a rejection of the single impulse theory when successive acts of grand
larceny have been committed. Were this theory to apply in this situation, the state would be required to charge one grand larceny when
several had been committed. Punishment would not be commensurate
with the gravity of the offenses. The Adimi case, indeed, is a good
illustration of 'this point. Fourteen acts of grand larceny of property
valued in the hundreds of thousands of dollars were involved, but using the single impulse theory the state could have asked for a maxi24
mum punishment of five years.
While the conclusion in Adimi is sound, less sound was the method
used in reaching it. No mention was made that this opinion represents
the minority view in this country, nor did the court discuss the varying
interpretations of the common law crime of larceny. The court could
have buttressed its conclusion by explaining the reasoning behind it.
This would aid in sustaining the position in the future.
WMWM Joos

Mich. 64, 163 N.W. 484 (1917); State v. Furth, 82 Wash. 665, 144 Pac. 907
(1914).
24. FLA. STAT. §811.021(2) (1963).
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